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Abstract
Due to the current political challenges facing democratic societies, including an apparent presence of 
populist rhetoric, the question of how political discussions should take place in democratic education 
is as urgent as ever. In the last two decades, one of the most prominent approaches to this question has 
been the use of deliberative theory. However, the deliberative approach has been criticized from an 
agonistic perspective for neglecting the role of emotions in political discussions. Deliberative theo-
rists have in turn responded to this critique and argued that the agonistic approach tends to put too 
much emphasis on students’ emotions and identities in political discussions. Recently, as a contribu-
tion to this debate, the idea of assimilating agonism with deliberation has been suggested as a way of 
overcoming the differences between agonism and deliberative theory.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the educational debate between agonism and delib-
erative theory by exploring the deliberative critique from the vantage point of agonism. I claim that 
the deliberative critique of agonism is unfounded and based on a misreading of Mouffe’s agonistic 
theory. Furthermore, I argue that the attempt to assimilate agonism with deliberation is not compati-
ble with Mouffe’s agonistic theory.
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If schools aim to educate students to become active democratic citizens, we need to ask what kind of experi-ences political discussions in the classroom should provide 
students with. When students discuss a political issue in the 
classroom setting, where different and conflicting opinions about 
their common future may clash, what should be in the foreground? 
For instance, should the teacher aim to establish a communicative 
situation where the goal is to reach a collective will- formation, or 
should he or she aim to highlight yet maintain the differences and 
conflictual aspects of the students’ claims and opinions? 
Furthermore, what role should the students’ identities and emo-
tions play in these political discussions?
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In the research field of citizenship education, the question of 
how political and controversial issues can (and should) take place 
in the classroom has been of great interest for educational scholars 
(see Hess, 2009; Ruitenberg, 2009; Samuelsson, 2016). Political 
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discussions among students in the classroom have been high-
lighted by leading scholars as being of vital importance, not only 
for a democratic education, but also for a democratic society (see 
Hess, 2009; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 359). The paper takes 
its starting point in this scholarly discussion and focuses on the 
normative question of what the guiding principles for political 
discussions in citizenship education should be. In the last two 
decades, one of the most prominent approaches to this question 
has been the use of deliberative theory (see Samuelsson & Bøyum, 
2015, p. 77; see also McAvoy & Hess, 2013; Roth, 2006). From the 
perspective of deliberative theory, critique has been directed 
toward what can be seen as an alternative ideal for political 
discussions in the classroom, namely, the agonistic ideal.
In short, the deliberative ideal and the agonistic ideal promote 
different views of classroom discussions. The deliberative ideal 
emphasizes that a classroom discussion should establish a commu-
nicative situation in which different opinions can meet and 
confront each other in a respectful way. Furthermore, the delibera-
tive ideal underlines that even though a conflict can be a starting 
point for a discussion, the aim should be to transcend differences 
and conflicts. In other words, the participants in the discussion 
should aim towards some form of collective will- formation 
(Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015).
The agonistic ideal, on the other hand, emphasizes the 
political dimension of conflicts between different opinions and 
visions of society. This means that conflicts between opinions 
cannot be reduced to rational deliberation but are bound up with 
the participants’ identities and emotions (see Ruitenberg, 2009; 
Zembylas, 2011). From an agonistic perspective, a collective 
will- formation should be understood in terms of hegemony rather 
than as rational consensus (Gürsözlü, 2009).
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the educational 
debate between agonism and deliberative theory by exploring the 
deliberative critique from the vantage point of agonism. I critically 
explore two arguments against the agonistic ideal and the idea of 
assimilating agonism with deliberation. I claim that the delibera-
tive critique of agonism, concerning identities and emotions in 
education, is unfounded and based on a misreading of Mouffe’s 
(2005) agonistic theory.
The first argument to be explored is the role of students’ 
identities when discussing political issues in the classroom. The 
argument is that the agonistic ideal puts too much emphasis on 
identities and less on the political issue itself. The second argument 
concerns the role of emotions in classroom discussions and  
states that when the agonistic ideal brings emotions into class-
room discussions, it can prevent students openly and construc-
tively discussing the political problems and issues they are facing. 
Furthermore, the idea of assimilating agonism with deliberation in 
education is explored against the background of previous attempts 
at similar assimilations in the field of political theory (see Khan, 
2013; Knops, 2007; Markell, 1997).
First, some of the ways in which deliberative theorists have 
discussed and handled the role of emotions in education are 
outlined. Second, agonistic theory and key issues concerning the 
role of emotions in an agonistic approach to citizenship education 
are presented. Finally, and in three succeeding sections, the 
deliberative critique of agonistic education and the attempt to 
assimilate agonism with deliberation are explored.
Deliberative Education and the Role of Emotions
In the field of education, the deliberative perspective is not a single 
body of coherent principles but consists of different ideas about 
what should characterize deliberation (Samuelsson & Bøyum, 
2015). Thus, educational scholars advocating a deliberative 
approach in education emphasize different aspects of deliberation. 
For example, Peterson (2009) has underlined the role of civic 
listening, empathy, and internal reflection, while Gutmann (1987) 
has emphasized deliberation in relation to a democratic society 
and formulated it as a condition for citizens’ conscious social 
reproduction. From Gutmann’s perspective, one of the aims of 
education is to facilitate democratic virtue in terms of “the ability 
to deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social repro-
duction” (Gutmann, 1987, p. 46). However, Roth (2000) has 
criticized Gutmann’s notion of “conscious social reproduction” as 
being too deterministic and instead has formulated deliberation in 
terms of “cultural mediation,” where communication is oriented 
toward intersubjective understanding (Roth, 2000, pp. 88– 89).
In a literature review of the field of deliberative education, 
Samuelsson & Bøyum (2015) identified two main strands in the 
theoretically oriented studies of deliberative education. One strand 
articulates the deliberative ideal as political decision- making and 
draws mainly on the works of Habermas and Gutmann. The other 
focuses on deliberation as a way of life, where deliberation is related 
to the way in which people can morally live together. The latter 
conception of deliberation draws more on the works of Dewey. 
However, some general points of agreement can be identified in the 
deliberative ideal (Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015; Samuelsson, 2016). 
One is the importance of enabling diverse opinions and partici-
pants being able to change their minds about the issue at stake 
(Hanson & Howe, 2011; Parker, 2011). A second is that participants 
listen to each other and that each participant is treated with 
respect. A third issue that the strands agree on is that the discus-
sion should aim toward some form of collective will- formation, 
that is, that the deliberation is in some way directed toward the 
participants’ collective agreement (Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015).
I will now turn to the question of how the role of emotions has 
been handled in deliberative theory. First, I describe the critique 
that stems from agonistic theory and how deliberative theory 
handles the role of emotions in classroom discussions. Here, the 
word emotions is used synonymously with passions. In the passages 
in which passions is used, rather than emotions, it reflects other 
authors’ arguments. However, using the term emotions in relation 
to Mouffe’s agonistic theory is problematic, because Mouffe makes 
a conceptual distinction between emotions and passions and states 
that she theorizes passions. She uses the term passion because, as 
she puts it, “it allows me to underline the dimension of conflict and 
to suggest a confrontation between collective political identities, 
two aspects that I take to be constitutive of politics” (Mouffe, 2014, 
p. 149). Ruitenberg (2009), however, has formulated emotions as a 
central concept in relation to the agonistic approach to citizenship 
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education. As the analysis in this paper draws on the educational 
take on agonistic theory and Ruitenberg’s distinction between 
political and moral emotions, the term emotions is used most and 
no conceptual distinction is made between emotions and passions.
The agonistic critique of the role of emotions in deliberative 
theory is captured in Ruitenberg’s wording “that liberal delibera-
tive approaches to democracy, in their emphasis on reason, have 
underestimated the importance of the emotions” (Ruitenberg, 
2009, p. 273). Similarly, the agonistic critique of how deliberative 
theory fails to recognize the central role of emotions in politics and 
political discussions has been responded to by scholars advocating 
deliberation, thereby turning it into a vibrant and ongoing 
conversation. One response to the critique is that it is based on 
misconceptions about deliberative theory. Samuelsson & Bøyum 
(2015) have pointed out that a deliberative response has been that 
“no major deliberative theorist has ever held that deliberators 
should rely on pure reason alone and avoid all appeals to emotion” 
(p. 83). Another response to the agonistic critique comes from 
deliberative theorist Dryzek (2005), who stresses that the concept 
of communication is wider than reason and rational argumenta-
tion. Dryzek has maintained that deliberative communication 
comes in many forms, such as “rhetoric, testimony, performance, 
gossip, and jokes” (p. 224). Nonetheless, the role of emotions is a 
debated issue in deliberative theory (Samuelsson, 2016).
The strategies for dealing with the question of emotions in 
deliberative theory follow different routes. Also, the critique not 
only stems from agonistic theory but also from the deliberative 
approach itself. From a deliberative perspective, Griffin (2012) has 
argued that Gutmann & Thompson “defend an instrumental 
understanding of passion as potentially intelligent tool for the 
deliberative citizen” (p. 522) and that “their understanding of the 
role of emotions remains unsatisfactory because ‘they continue to 
conceive of deliberation exclusively in terms of reason’” (ibid., 
citing Hall). In turn, Griffin (2012) argued for a deliberative 
education that aims toward educating “emotional intelligent 
deliberative citizens” (p. 533), where students learn to handle and 
understand their own emotions. In the discussion of which role 
emotions/passions should play in political discussions in the 
classroom, Englund (2016) has formulated a position that places 
passions in the background without downplaying the importance 
of students’ commitment to deliberate. A further way of dealing 
with the role of emotions in deliberative education can be found in 
Samuelsson’s (2016) idea of gradually introducing controversial 
and emotionally charged topics into the classroom. As I read 
Samuelsson, the idea is that the teacher first needs to establish a 
“deliberative communicative pattern” (p. 7) in the classroom, 
where students can develop and improve their skills to deliberate 
with each other. Then, once such a communication pattern is 
established, and students have improved their deliberating skills, 
more emotionally charged topics can be discussed in the 
classroom.
Ideas like those of Griffin, Englund, and Samuelsson can be 
considered different ways in which contemporary deliberative 
theory addresses the critique that emotions are underestimated in 
deliberative theory. I return to the role of emotions in deliberative 
theory later, after first outlining the agonistic position on emotion 
and identity in the field of citizenship education.
Agonistic Education and the Role of Emotions
Drawing on Mouffe’s (2005) theory of agonistic pluralism, 
Ruitenberg (2009) outlines an agonistic approach in which she 
highlights the importance of enabling political emotions in 
classrooms. According to Ruitenberg, political emotions can be 
considered an essential aspect of political and democratic life. 
Thus, in educating students as democratic and political adversar-
ies, political emotions need to have a legitimate place in citizenship 
education. The role of emotions as a vital component of an 
agonistic education is also stressed by Sund & Öhman (2014): 
“Passion has a political dimension that is important to emphasise 
in education, especially when consensus- oriented approaches in 
education run the risk of falling short in terms of acknowledging 
the political” (p. 654). In defining political emotions, Ruitenberg 
makes a distinction between political and moral emotions. 
Whereas political emotions are directed toward a societal object, 
such as homelessness, a moral emotion is directed toward a 
personal, or interpersonal, object. An example of a moral emotion 
is anger about “one’s cheating brother’s moral transgression” 
(Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 277). In a classroom discussion about a politi-
cal issue, it is political emotions and not moral emotions that 
should be given a legitimate place. In the agonistic approach, 
conflicts in classrooms are considered in terms of not only 
problems that need to be “handled” by the teacher but also as 
unavoidable aspects of a democratic life together with others  
(see Todd, 2010). Ruitenberg highlights the need for political 
disputes to remain political without being reduced to personal 
conflicts between students or to a “debate competition.” In contrast 
to personal conflicts and competing debate teams, political 
disputes can be understood in terms of “confrontations in the 
public sphere of arguments for ‘clearly differentiated democratic 
positions’” (Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 278, citing Mouffe). Such confron-
tations are clearly not person- oriented, but are bound up with 
substantially different visions of what a just society is and how it 
should be achieved. In that sense, “the other” becomes a legitimate 
political adversary rather than a mere debate competitor. This 
approach to conflicts can be understood in terms of enabling 
students to see that the lines between “us” and “them” are  
changeable and can be redefined. Or, as Todd (2009) formulates 
the educational process of reframing conflicts, it could be under-
stood as:
helping students to reframe expressions of conflict as constituting we/
they relations— relations which are continually shifting and 
contingent— and to help them recognize that the point is not to win 
the argument, or to eschew the passions of others, but to live in that 
fragile and unstable space of “conflictual consensus.” (p. 114)
A central aspect in this agonistic education is the destabilization of 
essentialist identities that can open up for politically formulated 
identities that are compatible with democracy. In other words, it is 
about enabling identities that are bound up with different visions 
of liberty and equality, rather than identities that revolve around 
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essentially fixed conceptions of who “we” and “they” are. Destabi-
lizing the frontiers between “us” and “them” and changing essen-
tialistically drawn lines into politically articulated differences is the 
transformation of the enemy into the adversary. It is thus this 
transformation of antagonism into agonism that lies at the heart of 
agonistic education. Zembylas (2011) highlights what the move 
from an essentialist understanding of identities can mean in 
education and argues that “an agonistic democracy in citizen-
ship education embraces plural belongings, not in essentialist 
terms but rather in contingent ones. This means . . . a refocusing of 
the emphasis from social engagement on the basis of ethnic 
identities to that of political engagement . . .” (p. 64). Focusing on 
identity and belonging as interrelated with political engagement, 
rather than grounded in essentialist identities, could also be  
a suitable precondition for acknowledging students as political 
subjects “here and now” and not just as citizens “to be.” Seeing 
students as “already” political subjects, with an opportunity  
to signify their own visions and hopes in political terms, could be 
contrasted with the view in which their perceived essentialist 
identity prescribes them with political claims (Todd, 2010).
To sum up, the agonistic approach that takes shape from these 
outlines highlights the importance of sustaining the political in 
emotions, conflicts, and identities. It is an approach that aims to 
make room for political subjectivity as a contingent and open 
endeavour. The next section focuses on two arguments against 
agonistic education and explores the idea of assimilating agonism 
with deliberation.
Identity or Issue: What Should the Conflict Be About?
The first argument to be explored is the relation between identities 
and political issues in classroom discussions. The deliberative 
critique of agonism highlights that the agonistic approach places 
students’ identities in focus, rather than the political issue itself. By 
doing this, conflicts can easily become clashes between individuals, 
rather than between political ideals or perspectives. A main 
difference between deliberation and agonism is that “deliberation 
brings into focus the conflict, the problem, and the different views 
on a particular substantive issue, while agonism focuses, rather, on 
the different (often ethnic) identities of the persons/adversaries 
involved, not on the problem (whatever it is) itself ” (Englund, 
2016, p. 69).
As I understand this argument, the idea is that by placing an 
issue in the foreground of the discussion, rather than identity, the 
more nuanced and dynamic the discussion will become. Charac-
terizing deliberation in the public sphere, Dryzek (2005) highlights 
that it is reasonable to believe that the more emphasis that is put on 
the identity of the communicating participants, the more difficult 
it will be for them to change their minds about the issue in ques-
tion. In other words, it is difficult to change your mind about an 
issue “if one’s position is tied to one’s identity” (Dryzek, 2005, 
p. 229). In relation to classroom discussions, the argument is that if 
students are encouraged to openly discuss an issue, rather than 
encounter each other from the vantage point of their identity, they 
will be better suited to meet and solve the political issues they are 
facing. From this perspective, a deliberative approach to classroom 
discussions seems to be more in line with a citizenship education 
that fosters mutual respect between citizens than the agonistic 
approach. Englund (2016) expresses it like this:
I believe that focusing on personal identities is likely to lead to 
struggles between individuals, and that views built into and deeply 
rooted in identities make rational deliberation over the problem itself, 
and a shared effort to define the problem, more difficult. (p. 69)
Thus, when identity is in focus, it risks foreclosing the possibilities 
of rational deliberation by creating conflicts between individuals, 
instead of enabling the problem itself to enter the foreground. 
Dryzek (2005) argues that one potential of deliberation is that it 
aims toward transcending identity- based conflicts by linking 
identities to more general principles of humanity. In this way, 
conflicts do not have to stay identity- based or be framed in 
essentialist terms, even if they started out as such, but instead have 
the potential to move beyond this point and open up for construc-
tive reconciliation.
How should the critique that agonism is too oriented toward 
students’ identities be understood? Should the emphasis on 
identities in the agonistic approach be understood as one that 
moves the focus away from the political issue itself? As I see it, the 
deliberative critique rests on two unfounded and erroneous claims 
about the agonistic conception of identities. First, the critique 
assumes that a focus on students’ identities substantially differs 
from a focus on the issue itself. Thus, the critique presupposes that 
a sharp distinction between identities and political issues can be 
maintained (cf. Ljunggren, 2010). Second, the critique assumes 
that the agonistic approach embraces essentialist identity- 
formations, such as ethnic identities. However, the deliberative 
critique effectively points to how this aspect of the agonistic 
approach needs theoretical clarification in relation to education. 
To explore this critique further, I turn to the agonistic conception 
of identity.
From an agonistic perspective, the conflicts between identi-
ties formulated in essentialist terms are highly problematic. Such 
conflicts, where the other is an enemy to be attacked rather than an 
adversary to defeat in the realm of politics, need to be handled 
within the institutions of society. On this point, agonistic and 
deliberative theorists seem to agree that conflicts between identi-
ties that are formulated in essentialist terms need to be avoided. 
However, what they disagree on is how such conflicts should be 
avoided. Englund and Dryzek have suggested deemphasizing and 
moving beyond identity positions in political discussions, whereas 
Ruitenberg and Mouffe would prefer to enable alternative collec-
tive identities, that is, identities that are not formulated in essen-
tialist terms.
The starting point for the agonistic approach to citizenship 
education is that some formations of collective identities will take 
shape in the classroom regardless of whether or not they are 
recognized by the teacher. Consequently, the focus from an 
agonistic perspective is the enabling of identity formations that are 
compatible with democracy. Defining which identity formations 
are compatible with democracy depends on the distinction 
between agonism and antagonism. This means that identity 
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formations that frame “the other” as an enemy, rather than an 
adversary, are not compatible with democracy. Where “the other” 
is framed as an adversary, the conflict between “us” and “them” 
stems from substantially different visions about what a just society 
is, rather than from ideas about the other’s essential traits. In 
outlining what agonism could imply in citizenship education, 
Zembylas (2011) writes: “Undoubtedly, the encounter with the 
other, as Schaap asserts, is always conditioned by the interpretive 
framework (or identity) we bring to it; however, this does not imply 
that certain ethnic or other identities should become hegemonic or 
reified [emphasis added]” (pp. 62– 63). In other words, the agonistic 
approach could be understood as one in which identity matters, 
but where not every identity formation is desirable.
Mouffe (2005) highlights that if agonistic collective identities 
are not enabled by societal institutions, there is a risk that conflicts 
will be played out in an essentialist register, where the other is seen 
as an enemy rather than an adversary:
If this adversarial configuration is missing, passions cannot be given a 
democratic outlet and the agonistic dynamics of pluralism are 
hindered. The danger arises that the democratic confrontation will 
therefore be replaced by a confrontation between essentialist forms of 
identification or non- negotiable moral values. (p. 30)
Thus, the deliberative critique of how agonism emphasizes 
identities is unfounded in its assertion that this is an emphasis on 
essentialist identities. On the contrary, it is precisely these forms of 
identifications that the agonistic approach aims to counter. From 
the perspective of agonistic theory, it is the lack of adversarial 
relations that can enable the growth of identities in essentialist 
terms, such as ethnic identities. The agonistic approach draws 
instead on an understanding of identities in terms of plural and 
contingent belongings (Zembylas, 2011, p. 64).
To sum up, the focus of the agonistic approach is not essential-
ist identities. On the contrary, the agonistic approach places the 
confrontation between substantially different visions of society in 
the foreground. It is an approach that puts the political issue in 
focus, but in contrast to the deliberative approach, where the role 
of identities is placed in the background, it aims to enable collective 
identities to be shaped by different political visions of society (see 
Mouffe, 2005, pp. 29– 31).
As I see it, the agonistic approach highlights the close 
interplay between identities and political issues by emphasizing the 
importance of collective identities in political discussions. 
Consequently, the main difference between the deliberative 
approach and the agonistic approach is not whether the political 
issue or political identity should be in focus but whether a relation 
between identities and political issues should be taken into account 
in citizenship education. This is an aspect that does not seem to be 
acknowledged by the deliberative approach in its critique of 
agonism.
One way of exploring the relation between identity and issue 
further is through the concept of political emotions, emotions that 
are directed toward social and political issues. However, the 
agonistic approach has been criticized from a deliberative perspec-
tive for putting too much emphasis on the role of emotions in 
classroom discussion. This critique is explored further in the next 
section.
Is There Room for Political Emotions in the Classroom?
From an agonistic perspective, emotions are an integrated aspect of 
political and democratic life. It is therefore not surprising that an 
agonistic approach to citizenship education emphasizes the vital 
role of emotions in political classroom discussions.
From a deliberative stance, emotions in political discussion 
are risky. As indicated above, deliberative theory handles this risk 
in different ways (see Englund, 2016; Griffin, 2012; Samuelsson, 
2016). One risk with bringing emotions into political discussions is 
that they can transform conflict between political positions into 
conflicts between individuals. In identity- based discussions, 
emotions can play a key role in such a transformation. Bringing 
emotions into identity- based classroom discussions is therefore at 
odds with the deliberative ideal.
[I]dentity- based discussions, which are different from deliberation 
with a focus on a substantive problem, also tend to bring passion into 
the discussion (a point also explicitly underlined in agonism, when it 
says that deliberative theorists underestimate the emotions)— a 
passion which I think a deliberative approach would frequently be 
hesitant to promote. (Englund, 2016, p. 69)
From a deliberative perspective, emotions in political discussions 
should be handled and controlled by the teacher and the students 
together. However, as Englund (2016) points out, these kinds of 
emotions should not be confused with commitment:
I believe that, from a deliberative point of view, passion in the 
classroom should, if possible, be interactively controlled and nuanced 
by both the teacher and the students (or at least efforts made in that 
direction), while still leaving room for commitment in the 
argumentative process. (p. 69)
The argument should not be interpreted as a total rejection of 
emotions in the classroom. Rather, it is the task of the teacher to 
analyze the classroom situation. Even though emotions, especially 
in identity- based discussions, are hazardous, Englund (2016) 
argues that: “There are of course occasions where passion has to be 
brought in, if the school class is indifferent towards touching on 
problems and conflicting views” (p. 73). In other words, emotions 
should not be fuelled or emphasized by the teacher when students 
are discussing political issues in the classroom, except in certain 
situations where there is widespread indifference among the 
students. Consequently, according to the deliberative critique, a 
problem with the agonistic approach is that the emphasis on 
emotions in agonism tends to constrain the potential of the 
communicative situations in the classroom by moving the focus 
away from the political issue itself towards students’ different 
identities. Such a move risks transforming conflicts over a political 
issue into personal conflicts between students (see Englund, 2016, 
p. 69).
To explore this argument, it is important to highlight how the 
agonistic understanding of emotions that Ruitenberg (2009) and 
other agonistic- oriented educational scholars formulate is not a 
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valid target for the deliberative critique. As indicated above, 
Ruitenberg (2009) has defined political emotions as emotions 
directed toward societal issues, such as homelessness, and moral 
emotions as being directed towards personal or interpersonal 
issues (cf. White, 2012, pp. 2– 3). The essential difference between 
the two kinds of emotions is that they are directed toward different 
kind of objects. Accordingly, Ruitenberg argues that they should 
not be seen as equally relevant in classroom discussions but that it 
is the political emotions that should have a given place in class-
room discussions. With this distinction in the foreground, the 
argument from deliberative theory becomes problematic. The core 
of this argument is that by bringing emotions into the classroom, 
conflicts will become personal between students, which is undesir-
able. Instead, the focus should be on the political issue itself. This 
argument would be decisive if the agonistic approach embraced 
moral emotions as relevant for political discussions in the class-
room. However, when it comes to embracing political emotions 
that are directed toward social relations and issues, the deliberative 
argument does not seem to undermine the agonistic approach. On 
the contrary, both Ruitenberg (2009) and Englund (2016) seem to 
agree that it is a problem if emotions in a classroom discussion 
become person- oriented. Ruitenberg (2009) is clear on this point; 
“educating political emotions would require that students learn to 
distinguish between emotions on behalf of themselves and 
emotions on behalf of a political collective, i.e., on behalf of views 
for the social order” (p. 276). What the two scholars seem to 
disagree on is how person- oriented emotions should be handled or 
avoided. Englund (2016) argues that the teacher and the students 
should jointly and interactively control person- oriented emotions/
passions, whereas Ruitenberg argues that students need to learn to 
distinguish between their political emotions and their moral 
emotions:
The emotions relevant to political education are not those associated 
with a personal sense of entitlement or with a collective based on an 
essentialist conception of identity, but rather emotions on behalf of a 
political collective, associated with views of particular hegemonic 
social relations. (Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 277)
This implies that the emotions that are supported by the agonistic 
approach are directed away from personal issues and are instead 
directed toward social issues and bound up with collective 
identities.
However, even though Ruitenberg’s distinction answers the 
deliberative critique, it is still problematic. We could ask whether it 
is reasonable to hold a position that requires students to decide if 
their emotion qualifies as a political or a moral emotion. Such an 
understanding places emotions in a rather strong rationalistic 
framework. I have elsewhere argued that a definition of political 
emotions that takes it starting point in which object the emotion is 
directed towards is a problematic way of discerning whether it is a 
political emotion or not (Tryggvason, 2017).
From an agonistic perspective, a point of departure for 
defining political emotions could instead be found in the agonistic 
notion of the political as an articulated and contingent distinction 
between “us” and “them”. If emotions in this sense are bound up 
with the question of collective identities, in which what I feel is 
inseparable from who I am (see Boler, 1999), then political emo-
tions, in terms of being emotions that are directed toward social 
and political issues, can be seen as something that binds the 
identity to the political issue. In relation to the previous section, 
this conception of political emotions makes it difficult to sustain 
the sharp distinction between identity and issue that the 
deliberative theory rests on in its critique of agonism.
Still, even if the role of political emotions in classrooms could 
be further emphasized, it does not mean that all political emotions 
should be seen as relevant in a democratic citizenship education. In 
theorizing agonistic emotions, Mihai (2014) stresses that emotions 
that are relevant for democracy “must not violate certain rules of 
engagement with the different other, the very rules that undergird 
a democratic ethos and that make agonism possible” (p. 40). For a 
societal institution, such as education, an important task is to 
enable political emotions that are within the ethico- political values 
of democracy (Sund & Öhman, 2014, p. 653– 654; see also Mihai, 
2014, p. 44).
Emotions in themselves are therefore not as problematic from 
the agonistic perspective. However, they do become problematic or 
irrelevant if they are directed toward the personal lives of other 
students, or if their political content is antagonistic or antidemo-
cratically oriented (Mihai, 2014, p. 45). Thus, I argue that the 
agonistic notion of political emotions that are relevant in class-
room discussions coincides with Englund’s notion of commitment. 
However, where Englund has advocated commitment, as opposed 
to indifference, an agonistic approach would be to understand this 
in terms of emotions, such as political hope instead of political 
resentment (see Mihai, 2014).
Given the agonistic understanding of how the political 
dimension of emotions is bound up with collective identities and 
the boundaries between “us” and “them,” emotions cannot be 
“brought into” political discussions. If the discussion truly is 
political, then the emotions are already there. The main question 
that the deliberative critique points to is therefore not whether 
emotions should be brought into the discussions or not, but rather: 
How can emotions that revolve along the line between “us” and 
“them,” in ways that are compatible with the ethico- political values 
of liberty and equality, be given the possibility to flourish in the 
classroom? In other words, how can the lines between different 
visions of liberty and equality, and the emotions bound up with 
these, be continuously drawn and redrawn within education?
The Problems with Assimilating Agonism with Deliberation
Against the background of the above sections, we could ask 
whether agonism and deliberative theory can be assimilated in a 
fruitful way. Some similarities can be identified between agonism 
and deliberation, such as the joint critique of essentialist identi-
ties and person- oriented emotions within education, which could 
indicate a fruitful assimilation between them. However, in the 
following, I argue that the attempt to assimilate agonism with 
deliberation in citizenship education cannot be successful if the 
notion of agonism stems from Mouffe’s theory of agonistic 
pluralism. Drawing on previous debates in the field of political 
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theory, Mouffe’s agonism appears to be incompatible with the 
central assumptions of deliberative theory. Instead, I argue that an 
assimilation of this kind would have to be based on other notions 
and definitions of agonism if it is to be successful.
In the field of political theory, several different ideas about 
how agonism and deliberation could be integrated have been put 
forward (Jezierska, 2011; Khan, 2013; Knops, 2007; Markell, 1997). 
The political theorist Gürsözlü (2009) has pointed out that 
attempts to assimilate agonistic theory with deliberative theory can 
either be seen as a strategy to formulate deliberation as agonism, or 
to formulate agonism as deliberation. The former strategy stresses 
the agonistic and conflictual aspects of deliberative theory (e.g., 
Knops, 2007), while the latter emphasizes that agonistic theory is 
dependent on an idea of consensus and collective will- formation 
(e.g., Erman, 2009). In the following, the discussion is limited to 
the formulation of deliberation as agonism, because this strategy 
has been put forward in the field of citizenship education.
In the strategy of formulating deliberation as agonism, 
agonistic struggles are regarded as a component that is handled by 
deliberation. Hence, deliberation is already seen as agonistic in its 
characteristics in that it takes its starting point in the conflict. As 
Gürsözlü (2009) expresses it, it is an idea that “discursive politics 
does not only tolerate agonistic political action but also requires it” 
(p. 362). The difference from a deliberative perspective is that 
deliberative theory places an ideal to move beyond the point of 
agonistic struggles. Agonistic theory lacks such an ideal. However, 
the strategy to assimilate agonism with deliberative theory is 
problematic. In his critique of Markell’s (1997) attempt to assimilate 
agonism with deliberation, Gürsözlü (2009) shows that the 
approach to equate the agonistic notion of conflict with the 
deliberative notion of conflict would result in a “tamed version” of 
agonism, where antagonism as a constituent of agonism is over-
looked (p. 364).
In the field of education, the strategy of formulating delibera-
tion as agonism can be identified in Englund’s (2016) idea of seeing 
“agonism as a link to deliberation” (p. 70). The starting point for 
this line of reasoning is that agonism is seen as an attempt to 
overcome antagonism, because it is a transformation of antagonis-
tic struggles between deadly enemies into democratic struggles 
between political adversaries. From Englund’s deliberative 
perspective, a reasonable question is why citizenship education 
should settle with agonism as an end, when it can aim towards 
deliberative ideals. Englund emphasizes that some form of conflict 
constitutes a necessary precondition for deliberation. Accordingly, 
an agonistic conflict can therefore be a first step and a precondition 
for the second step, which is deliberation. From this perspective, 
deliberation is understood as both a qualification and a transfor-
mation of agonistic struggles into a communicative situation that 
starts with a conflict but does not place the conflict as the end 
point. In this sense, deliberation is already incorporating the 
conflictual aspects emphasized by agonistic theory while at  
the same time aiming to overcome them. In short, deliberation is 
seen as being agonistic because it stems from a conflict, although it 
differs from agonism in its normative aim to reach beyond the 
conflict. Returning to the field of political theory, Gürsözlü’s 
critique of Markell seems to be applicable to this educational idea 
of formulating “agonism as a link to deliberation.” In my view, there 
are two main reasons as to why the idea of agonism as a link to 
deliberation is not compatible with Mouffe’s theory of agonism. 
Following Gürsözlü, such an approach needs to be based on a 
“tamed version” of agonism if it is to be successful.
First, the idea of seeing agonism as a link to deliberation and 
the ambition to overcome the adversarial relation rests on the 
assumption that antagonism can be eradicated. This assimilative 
attempt does not take into account that agonism is not a relation 
where antagonism is overcome, but a relation where antagonism is 
merely sublimated. One of Mouffe’s central arguments is that if 
there is no room for agonistic conflicts, then there is an overarching 
risk that conflicts will become antagonistic: “My argument is that, 
when the channels are not available through which conflicts could 
take an ‘agonistic’ form, those conflicts tend to emerge on the 
antagonistic mode” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 5). If agonism would be 
transformed into deliberation, conflicts could “emerge on  
the antagonistic mode.” Consequently, an attempt to overcome 
agonistic conflicts and transform them into deliberation presup-
poses that antagonism could be eradicated. Such a proposal is at 
direct odds with Mouffe’s conception of agonism, which becomes 
clear in Mouffe’s formulation of the difference between her own 
theoretical position, which is grounded in Carl Schmitt and that of 
other agonistic scholars who draw on the works of Hannah Arendt 
and Friedrich Nietzsche:1 “[W]hat you have is ‘agonism without 
antagonism, whilst my position is ‘agonism with antagonism.’ My 
understanding of agonistic relation is that it is sublimated antago-
nism” (Mouffe, cited in Dreyer Hansen & Sonnichsen, 2014, 
p. 268).
This implies that even if a conflict is a precondition for 
deliberation, and agonism is a conflict between “friendly enemies” 
(Mouffe, 2000, p. 13), it does not mean that agonism can easily 
function as a precondition for deliberation. The agonistic notion  
of conflict clearly seems to differ from the deliberative notion of 
conflict. In Mouffe’s (2005) theory, antagonism is an ontological 
concept, while the deliberative notion of conflict is an ontic concept. 
As Mouffe formulates it, the agonistic conflict between adversaries 
is a sublimation of antagonism and never an eradication of 
antagonism. In contrast to this, in the deliberative perspective put 
forward by Englund, the notion of conflict designates a phenom-
enon that theoretically can be overcome, at least temporarily. 
Whether the conflict is overcome or not and consensus is achieved 
is, from the deliberative perspective, ultimately seen as an empiri-
cal question (see Englund, 2016, p. 66). The deliberative notion of 
conflict therefore clearly differs from the agonistic theory of 
antagonism as an ontological condition for human societies 
(Mouffe, 2005, p. 19). Thus, to successfully assimilate agonism with 
deliberation, an “agonism without antagonism” seem to be what is 
needed, rather than the notion of agonism that Mouffe formulates.
Second, if a rational consensus is, at least theoretically, 
conceivable, it implies that the agonistic idea of how collective 
1  Mouffe mentions Bonnie Honig as an agonistic scholar inspired by 
Hannah Arendt and William Connolly as a Nietzsche- inspired agonistic 
scholar (Dreyer Hansen & Sonnichsen, 2014).
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identities always constitute an outside is incorrect (see Mouffe, 
2005, pp. 14– 19). Thus, the idea that there is no need to settle with 
agonism because a rational consensus is achievable implies that 
politics without adversaries is possible. If there is a possibility to 
create political unity through open and rational deliberation, 
without creating an outside consisting of “others,” then very little is 
left of Mouffe’s agonistic theory. The attempt to assimilate agonism 
with deliberation therefore seems to ignore a core assumption in 
the agonistic theory, namely that an all- inclusive political consen-
sus is ultimately a contradiction. Given the Schmittian notion of 
the political as the distinction between “us” and “them,” which  
is the starting point for Mouffe’s (2005) agonistic theory, an 
all- inclusive political consensus is not possible to achieve. If it is  
an all- inclusive consensus, then it cannot be a political consensus. 
Moreover, if it is a political consensus, it cannot be all- inclusive. 
The critic could here point to how Mouffe’s agonistic theory is 
based on a conception of consensus in its idea of transforming the 
enemy into an adversary (e.g., Erman, 2009). However, when 
Mouffe (1999, p. 756) puts forward the need for a “conflictual 
consensus” on the ethico- political values of democracy, it is not an 
attempt to reach an all- inclusive consensus. Rather, as Gürsözlü 
(2009) has made clear, it aims for a constitution of hegemony: “As, 
such, for Mouffe, what consensus around liberal- democratic values 
means is the constitution of a hegemony not the elimination of it” 
(p. 359).
To sum up, if agonism is to be successfully assimilated with 
deliberation and seen as the first step toward deliberation, then 
Mouffe’s agonistic theory needs to be put aside and other more 
“tamed” notions of agonism put forward (see Gürsözlü, 2009, 
p. 364).
Conclusion
In this paper I argue that the deliberative critique of the agonistic 
approach to citizenship education is based on a misreading of  
the main concepts in agonistic theory. The argument is that the 
deliberative critique erroneously claims that agonism tends to 
emphasize essentialist identities in education, something which 
could add fuel to conflicts between persons rather than between 
political issues and perspectives.
Returning to the question of which principles should be the 
main ones for political discussions in the classroom, the agonistic 
approach and the deliberative approach provide different answers. 
From the agonistic perspective, a principle that summarizes the 
approach is the acknowledgment of the political dimension in 
emotions, identities, and conflicts. With this principle in the 
foreground, the agonistic approach highlights the intimate 
interplay between the political issue at stake and students’ identi-
ties and emotions when engaging in political discussions. From a 
deliberative stance, the main principles for political discussions in 
the classroom can be found in the procedural framework of 
classroom communication and are the principle of enabling 
diverse opinions, the principle of mutual respect between partici-
pants and the aim towards a collective will- formation (see Samu-
elsson, 2016).
This difference between agonism and deliberative theory stem 
from their different theoretical and political roots (in Habermas 
and Dewey on the one hand, and Mouffe on the other) and are 
ultimately based on different conceptions about politics and 
democracy. Thus, educating students to become active democratic 
citizens could mean different things if the teacher takes an agonis-
tic or a deliberative stance. With the contemporary challenges that 
democratic societies face, the role of citizenship education cannot 
be overestimated. How this citizenship education should take 
shape and which principles should be put in the foreground when 
students meet each other in political discussion are questions that 
need to be further discussed.
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